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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Parker Maloney contends the district court abused its discretion because it unduly
narrowed the scope of its discretion when it revoked his probation. Specifically, the district
court did not realize that Idaho law clearly provides that it, and not the probation officer, was
empowered to set the substantive tenns of Mr. Maloney's probation. As such, its detennination
that it could not tell the probation officer how to classify him on probation, and thus, its refusal
to consider his argument that the improper sex-offender tenns of probation had undennined his
period of probation, failed to appreciate the actual scope of its discretion and was inconsistent
with the applicable legal standards.

A similar issue is currently pending before the Idaho

Supreme Court in State v. le Veque, Docket Number 45704.
As a result of the district court's abuse of discretion, this Court should vacate the order
revoking Mr. Maloney's probation and remand this case for further proceedings.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Maloney was placed in the conflict resolution rider program following his guilty plea
to domestic battery for hitting his wife in the nose in the presence of their children. (R., pp.3941, 85-86, 108-09.) He did well in that rider program, completing his assigned classes without
any disciplinary issues. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-17.) At the
subsequent review hearing, the district court suspended Mr. Maloney's underlying sentence of
ten years, with eight years fixed, for a three-year period of probation. (R., pp. I08-09, 114-18.)
A year later, Mr. Maloney's probation officer filed a report of probation violation
alleging that Mr. Maloney had violated various terms of his probation, including several
allegations relating to terms of sex-offender supervision which had not been part of his initial
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tenns of probation.

(R., pp.121-27, 175-80; compare R., pp.116-18 (the original tenns of

probation imposed by the district court).) The probation officer recommended the district court
retain jurisdiction specifically to have Mr. Maloney participate in a sex-offender rider program.
(R., pp. I 25, 180.)
Mr. Maloney ultimately admitted to failing to complete community service, violating a
no-contact order, failing to complete an anger/domestic violence treatment program, and not
completing urinalysis tests as directed. (Tr., p.4, L.21 - p.5, L.4, p.6, Ls.1-4, p.10, Ls.8-19.) The
State withdrew the other allegations. (Tr., p.10, Ls.18-19.)
Mr. Maloney called his probation officer as a witness during the disposition proceedings.
(Tr., p.12, Ls.3-19.) The probation officer testified that she had added the sex-offender tenns to
Mr. Maloney's probation based on certain allegations which had accompanied a prior conviction
for domestic battery. 1 (Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.3.) However, she admitted that Mr. Maloney
had not entered a plea to, nor had there been a conviction for, any sex offense at that time.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.4-6, 13-15; see also Tr., p.18, Ls.11-16 (the probation officer admitting that the
crime Mr. Maloney had been convicted of had no sexual elements).) She also admitted the first
question on the Department of Correction's matrix which she used to justify ordering those sexoffender terms of probation - whether the defendant had been convicted for a sex offense - was
a threshold question, meaning if she could not answer that question in the affirmative, she was
not supposed to have moved any further in the matrix. (Tr., p.35, Ls.11-24; see also Tr., p.19,

1

During the probation officer's testimony, she referred to "Page 16" of the PSI, which she
indicated referenced the prior domestic battery conviction. (See, e.g., Tr., p.25, L.14 - p.26,
L.22.) However, in response to the Supreme Court's Order Granting Motions to Augment and to
Seal Portions of the Record, dated March 22, 2018, the district court clerk represented that "there
is no Page 16 in the PSI." A motion to augment the record with a copy of the district court
clerk's response has been filed contemporaneously with this brief.
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Ls. I 7-19; Defense Exhibit A (the IDOC matrix).) Finally, the probation officer admitted that the
terms and conditions added by the sex-offender classification changed the nature of the
supervision beyond what would have been expected under traditional supervision. (Tr., p.21,
Ls.3-11.)
In his allocution, Mr. Maloney explained that he had been working two jobs and still had
to choose between paying for housing and paying for the polygraphs his probation officer was
requiring as part of the sex-offender supervision. (Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.1.) He also explained
he could not live with his mother partially due to the fact that she lived close to a library, which
was also prohibited by the sex-offender terms of probation even though, as his probation officer
admitted, there was never any evidence that Mr. Maloney was a sexual danger to children.
(Tr., p.21, Ls.12-16, p.43, Ls.4-8.)
Trial counsel argued that, as a result of the probation officer's improper decision to order
Mr. Maloney to comply with the sex-offender terms of supervision, Mr. Maloney's period of
probation had not actually served the goal of probation - rehabilitation. (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40,
L.3.) As a result, trial counsel argued the district court should reinstate Mr. Maloney's probation
based on proper terms which would not include sex-offender supervision. (Tr., p.41, Ls.8-13.)
The prosecutor simply recommended the district court retain jurisdiction and allow the
Department of Correction to decide in which program to place Mr. Maloney. (Tr., p.38, L.24 p.39, L.8.)
The district court rejected both recommendations. In regard to Mr. Maloney's argument
regarding the sex-offender terms of probation, it concluded that "'[t]he Court finds it lacks the
ability to dictate how to classify and supervise [the probationer] to an executive branch agency
such as the State ofldaho Department of ... Correction."' (Tr., p.47, Ls.12-17 (quoting its own
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decision in State v. Le Veque, Kootenai County Case CRF-2013-11265).) In fact, it stated the
issue regarding that classification had "zero significance to me from a legal standpoint" because

it had not seen an appellate decision on that issue in Le Veque. (Tr., p.48, Ls.9-13.) However, it
noted that it was ultimately more concerned with the allegation that Mr. Maloney had violated
the term of probation regarding the no-contact order, and that the violation of the sex-offender
terms of probation "has little weight" in its decision to revoke Mr. Maloney's probation.
(Tr., p.45, Ls.10-21, p.48, L.13 - p.49, L.11.) Mr. Maloney filed a notice of appeal timely from
the order revoking probation.2 (R., pp.I 86, 190.)

2

Mr. Maloney also filed a motion for leniency under I.C.R. 35(b) eleven days after the order
revoking his probation. (R., pp.186, 188.) While the district court noted there was no new or
additional information attached to that motion and that the underlying sentence was not
unreasonable, it also ruled the motion was untimely because it had not been filed within 120 days
of the initial imposition of sentence. (R., pp.206-08.) Criminal Rule 35(b) expressly allows such
a motion to be timely if filed within fourteen days of an order revoking probation.
4

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it refused to consider Mr. Maloney's
argument that the sex-offender terms of probation had undermined his term of probation because
it had erroneously concluded that it could not tell the probation officer how to classify him.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Consider Mr. Maloney's
Argument That The Sex-Offender Terms Of Probation Had Undermined His Term Of Probation
Because It Had Erroneously Concluded That It Could Not Tell The Probation Officer How To
Classify Him
The district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Maloney's probation because
it did not recognize its authority to consider his argument regarding the sex-offender terms of his
probation ordered by his probation officer after his term of probation began. See, e.g., State v.

Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989) (explaining that a district court abuses its discretion when it
fails to appreciate the issue as one of discretion, when it fails to appreciate the outer boundaries
of its discretion or acts inconsistent with the applicable legal standards, or when it reaches a
decision without acting reasonably); State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 22 (Ct. App. 2011) ("The
first of these inquiries is satisfied only if the trial court correctly perceived the full scope of its
discretion."). "When a trial court has unduly narrowed the scope of its discretion through a
misapprehension of applicable law, the proper course of action is for the appellate court to
remand the case so that the trial court can make the discretionary decision anew, in light of the
proper legal standards governing that decision." State v. Brashier, 127 Idaho 730, 737 (Ct. App.
1995), abrogated on other grounds; accord State v. Villavicencio, 159 Idaho 430,437 (Ct. App.
2015).
Here, the district court unduly narrowed the scope of its discretion when it concluded it
did not have the ability to tell a probation officer how to classify a probationer. (Tr., p.47, L.9 p.48, L.8.) Idaho case law clearly holds the opposite is true. While probation officers, as a result
of their more-frequent contacts with the probationers, are given significant discretion to impose
various terms and conditions based on their assessment of the probationers' needs, there is
judicial check on that executive discretion: "Although this term may appear to give unfettered
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discretion to the probation officer, the exercise of that discretion is always subject to review by

the sentencing court, for a defendant may file a motion asking the court to countermand a
probation officer's counseling requirement if the defendant believes it to be unwarranted."

State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 811 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing J.C. § 20-221; State v. Oyler, 92
Idaho 43, 47 (1968); and State v. Williams, 126 Idaho 39, 44 (Ct. App. 1994)) (emphasis added).
The defendant may also challenge those terms of probation during the revocation proceedings.

State v. Hayes, 99 Idaho 713, 715 (1978); accord Oyler, 92 Idaho at 46-47; see also State v.
Mummert, 98 Idaho 452, 453-55 (1977); State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993)
("before a court reaches the factual predicate as to whether there was an actual violation [of a
term of probation], the determination must be made as to whether the term violated is valid.")
(internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Simply put, "only the sentencing court may set the
substantive conditions of probation." State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79, 83 (Ct. App. 2017)
(emphasis added).
Mr. Maloney's probation officer essentially admitted that the sex-offender terms of
probation she ordered in his case were substantive conditions, as they added various
requirements and expectations, such as the requirement that he be accompanied by a chaperone
when around children, which were not part of the general terms of probation. (See Tr., p.21,
Ls.3-11; R., pp.116-18.) Moreover, the probation officer all but admitted that applying those
terms to Mr. Maloney was improper because he had never been convicted of a crime that was
sexual in nature, which means there was no event to trigger application of the sex-offender terms
under IDOC's policies. (See Tr., p.15, L.1 - p.16, L.23, p.19, Ls.17-19; p.35, Ls.11-24; see also
Defense Exhibit A.) Accordingly, they were improper terms of probation because they were not
serving the goal of rehabilitation. State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807 (2004)) ("A condition of
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probation must be reasonably related to the purpose of probation, rehabilitation.") (emphasis
added).
As such, the district court should have declared those terms to be improper and
considered the impact that forcing Mr. Maloney to comply with those improper terms had on his
period of probation. Only by doing that could the district court adequately assess whether
continuing Mr. Maloney's probation could achieve the goal of rehabilitation. See, e.g., Slate v.
Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000) ("whether the probation is achieving the goal of

rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection of
society."). Therefore, Mr. Maloney's argument about his sex-offender classification did have
legal significance. (Compare Tr., p.48, Ls.11-13 (the district court failing to recognize that
fact).)

Since the district court failed to recognize that it had the discretion to consider

Mr. Maloney's argument about the sex-offender terms of probation, its decision to revoke
Mr. Maloney's probation was an abuse of its discretion and should be vacated.
Instead, the district court tried to justify its conclusion by quoting from its prior decision
Le Veque, where it had similarly refused to consider a defendant's challenge to the probation

officer's decision to add sex offender terms of probation. (See Tr., p.47, L.9 - p.48, L.8.)
Although the district court claimed to be ignorant of the fact (Tr., p.48, L.8),3 Mr. Le Veque had,
in fact, challenged that decision on appeal and that issue is currently pending in the Idaho
Supreme Court.

(See Docket Number 45704 (oral argument heard on May 11, 2018).)

Nevertheless, the district court said that, because it had not seen an appellate opinion on that

3

The Appellant's Brief in Le Veque, in which he challenged the district court's decision on that
point, was filed on January 4, 2017, and the Appellant's Reply Brief on May 24, 2017. See 2017
WL 103451; 2017 WL 2833269. The disposition hearing, at which the district court stated it was
not aware of any appeal in Le Veque, occurred on August 31, 2017. (See Tr., p.10, L.1.)
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issue, the classification issue had "zero significant to me from a legal standpoint." (Tr., p.48,
Ls.9-13.) The district court's conclusion in Le Veque was improper for the same reasons it is
improper in this case, and so, the district court's reference to its erroneous decision in Le Veque
case does not make its decision in Mr. Maloney's case any more reasonable. Its decision in
Mr. Maloney's case is still contrary to the established legal standards and fails to recognize the
outer bounds of its discretion. Therefore, that decision remains an abuse of discretion, and so,
this case should be remanded.
Remand is the appropriate result in this case despite the district court's primary focus of
Mr. Maloney's admission to violating the term regarding the no-contact order. (See generally
Tr., p.45, Ls.10-18, p.48, L.13 - p.49, L.11.) As the Court of Appeals has explained, "[w]hen a
trial court has unduly narrowed the scope of its discretion through a misapprehension of
applicable law, the proper course of action is for the appellate court to remand the case so that
the trial court can make the discretionary decision anew, in light of the proper legal standards
governing that decision." Brashier, 127 ldaho at 737. That remains true in Mr. Maloney's case
because, when deciding whether or not to revoke probation, the district court must determine
"whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the
probation is consistent with the protection of society." Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312. The district
court's conclusion that it could not consider Mr. Malonefs challenge to the sex-offender terms
of probation affected its ability to assess whether continuing Mr. Maloney's probation on
appropriate terms of supervision would serve that goal.
For example, the improper sex-offender terms of probation hampered Mr. Maloney's
ability to rehabilitate during the prior period of probation, as they deprived him of the ability to
get housing or take advantage of his support network. (See Tr., p.42, L.23 - p.43, L.8.) Others,
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such as needing a chaperone when around children, were not related to that goal at all.
Therefore, even though the district court focused on the no-contact order issue, its decision to
revoke Mr. Maloney's probation was still inconsistent with the applicable legal standards
because, without considering the impact of the improper terms of probation on Mr. Maloney's
rehabilitation, it was not considering the question the applicable legal standards directed it to
consider. As such, that decision should still be vacated as an abuse of its discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Maloney respectfully requests this Court vacate the order revoking his probation and
remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of June, 2018.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
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